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THE ITEM VETO POWER IN WASHINGTON
Abstract: Current use of the item veto power in Washington fails to check legislative
spending and encourages gubernatorial encroachment on the legislative appropriations
process. This Comment examines the history of the item veto and suggests reforms that
would permit use of the item veto power to achieve cost savings while minimizing separa-
tion of powers violations.
The item veto-often referred to as the "line-item veto"-is the
power of forty-three state governors to remove unacceptable portions
of bills, usually appropriation bills, without having to veto the entire
bill.1 The use of the item veto power has been accompanied by litiga-
tion and debate focusing on two major issues. The first issue concerns
separation of powers.2 When exercising the item veto power, the gov-
ernor participates in the legislative process.3 Because this process
otherwise is reserved to state legislatures,4 the item veto power cannot
be used beyond its constitutionally permissible scope. The second
major issue is whether use of the item veto has a practical effect in
reducing expenditures. The item veto originated as a means through
which governors could trim "pork barrel" appropriations-nonessen-
tial expenditures of public money for local projectsS-from appropria-
tions bills.6 Studies indicate that governors have used the item veto
with mixed success in achieving cost savings.7
1. There are three types of constitutional item veto provisions: the basic item veto, the item
reduction veto, and the amendatory veto. The basic item veto allows forty-three governors to
eliminate "items," "sections," or "parts" of bills, usually appropriations bills. Eleven states
grant their governors the additional authority to reduce items. Seven states have the amendatory
veto which allows the governor to recommend amendments to bills. See STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON RULES, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., ITEM VETO: STATE EXPERIENCE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE FEDERAL SITUATION apps. C-1, C-2, 'C-3 (Comm. Print 1986)
[hereinafter ITEM VETO REPORT]; see also Bellamy, Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon
of Presidential Power?, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 557, 559-61 (1988).
2. The separation of powers doctrine provides that each branch of government-executive,
legislative, and judicial-has a separate constitutional function, and with the exception of some
necessary overlap, one branch may not encroach upon the domain of the other. See Household
Fin. Corp. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 451, 455, 244 P.2d 260, 262-63 (1952).
3. Hallin v. Trent, 94 Wash. 2d 671, 677, 619 P.2d 357, 360 (1980), overruled on other
grounds, Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984).
4. Eg., WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1: "The legislative authority of the State of Washington shall
be vested in the legislature .... "
5. J. PLANO & M. GREENBERG, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 218-19 (7th ed.
1985).
6. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
7. See AMERICAN ENTER. INST., PROPOSALS FOR LINE-ITEM VETO AUTHORITY 17-18
(1984) [hereinafter AEI STUDY] (documenting savings of $26 million, $1.2 billion, and $1.15
billion achieved in 1983 by governors of Illinois, California, and Pennsylvania). But see Abney &
Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for
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Legislative and gubernatorial practices in Washington foster separa-
tion of powers violations and hinder use of the item veto as a check on
nonessential expenditures. Appropriations bill drafting practices and
item vetoes of dubious constitutionality illustrate the current problems
in Washington. This Comment suggests reforms that would restrict
the item veto to its proper constitutional scope and enhance its use in
reducing spending.
I. HISTORY OF THE ITEM VETO POWER
The item veto first appeared in the Provisional Constitution of the
Confederacy,8 and was later incorporated, with minor changes, into
the Permanent Confederate Constitution.9 After the Civil War, most
states eventually adopted an item veto provision."° The adoption of
these provisions was largely a result of widespread antilegislative bias
which prevailed during the "Age of Spoils" following the War."1 Two
factors fostered this bias: the reputation of legislators for corruption,
and the practice of passing hastily drafted legislation in the final days
of legislative sessions. 2 The public, considering executive power less
dangerous than legislative power, gave governors the item veto as pro-
tection against venal state legislators. t3
Partisanship?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 372, 375-77 (1985) (item veto used most often to further
executive or partisan interests; little empirical evidence of item veto's effectiveness in curtailing
expenditures); Hutchinson, Legislating Via Veto, STATE LEGISLATURES, January, 1989, at 20-21
(item veto subverts legislative intent and fosters political discord); McGeary, The Governor's Veto
in Pennsylvania, 41 AM. POL. Sci. 941, 943 (1947) (in Pennsylvania, legislators pad budgets with
expenditures for popular projects and let the governor make the unpopular decision to veto
them). See generally Fisher & Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto Be
Transferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 182-85 (1986).
8. Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, reprinted in S. Doc. No.
234, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 900 (1904).
9. The final version empowered the Confederate president to "approve any appropriation and
disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill." Id. at 913 (quoting PERMANENT CONST.
OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AM. art. I, § 7). Robert H. Smith, an Alabama delegate to
the Provisional Congress of the Confederacy, is credited with creation of the item veto concept.
Smith argued that the Confederate President should have the power to remove pork barrel
appropriations from appropriations bills while approving essential appropriations. ITEM VETO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7 (quoting Hon. R. Smith, "An Address to the Citizens of Alabama
on the Constitution and Laws of the Confederate States of America," at Temperance Hall, 7-8
(Mar. 30, 1861)).
10. Southern states, which were required to write acceptable constitutions for readmission to
the Union, incorporated the item veto into their revised constitutions. Western states admitted
to the Union after the war, and many older states, in the process of modernizing their
constitutions, also adopted item veto provisions. ITEM VETO REPORT, supra note I, at 4.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id.
13. Fisher & Devins, supra note 7, at 178. In addition to item veto provisions, states
approved other constitutional provisions designed to curb legislative abuses. Id. at 178-79.
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The perception that governors were more reliable than legislatures
grew during the early part of the twentieth century. Governors'
budgeting authority expanded during the second and third decades of
this century through budget reform movements that gave governors
the responsibility for budget preparation.14 The Great Depression val-
idated gubernatorial efforts to eliminate nonessential spending." Con-
fidence in executive power remained high until 1970, when Vietnam
and Watergate shook long-held assumptions about the innate benefits
of executive authority."6
The 1970's ushered in an era of legislative resurgence. State legisla-
tures became more professional. 1 7 They instituted procedural reforms,
hired committee staff, acquired sophisticated information systems, and
developed their own fiscal expertise.1 Buoyed by this new expertise,
legislatures accelerated court challenges to perceived abuses of the
item veto power, 19 and in several cases, amended constitutional item
veto provisions.20
II. HISTORY OF WASHINGTON'S ITEM VETO PROVISION
Prior to 1974, the relevant portion of article III, section 12 of the
Washington Constitution provided: "If any bill presented to the gov-
ernor contain several sections or items, he may object to one or more
sections or items while approving other portions of the bill."2 This
language was unique among state constitutional item veto provisions
because it provided for the veto of sections or items of any bill, includ-
ing general legislation that did not contain an appropriation.
Before 1959, Washington governors, with rare exception, used the
section veto power only on entire sections of bills and the item veto
power only on money items in appropriation bills.2 However, in a
Examples include provisions that restrict bills to one subject, ag., WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19,
prohibit special and local legislation, eg., WASH. CONT. art. II, § 28, limit state borrowing, eg.,
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, and restrict the content of general appropriations bills to
appropriations, eg., LA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
14. ITEM VETO REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
15. Fisher & Devins, supra note 7, at 178.
16. Id.
17. ITEM VETO REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
18. Id.
19. In preparing this Comment, the author reviewed 213 item veto cases dating back to 1898.
Of this total, 131 (62%) dated from 1970 to the present.
20. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a); WASH. CONsT. amend. LXII.
21. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, 572
(1962) [hereinafter JOURNAL].
22. Burke, The Partial Veto Power: Legislation by the Governdr, 49 WASH. L. REV. 603, 607
(1974).
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series of decisions, the Washington Supreme Court broadly construed
both the section and item veto powers.23 Chief among these decisions
was State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini.24 In Ruoff, the governor vetoed a
salary increase for the governor in a non-appropriation bill that raised
salaries of elected state officials.25 Without explanation, the court held
that the language vetoed was an "item" under article III, section 12
and that the item veto was not confined to appropriations bills.26
Narrowly construed, Ruoff held that the governor can veto mone-
tary provisions in any bill that might result in spending.27 Relying on
Ruoff, however, Washington governors began to veto sentences and
phrases in general legislation that did not contain appropriations,
often altering the meaning of substantive legislation.28 Use of the item
veto in this manner became routine and peaked in 1971-72, when Gov-
ernor Evans exercised 149 partial vetoes.29
In 1974, voters approved the 62nd amendment, which changed the
crucial language of article III, section 12 as follows:
If any bill presented to the governor contain several sections or appropri-
ation items, he may object to one or more sections or appropriation items
while approving other portions of the bill: Provided, That he may not
object to less than an entire section, except that if the section contain one
or more appropriation items he may object to any such appropriation item
or items.
30
The 62nd amendment narrowed the governor's power to veto parts of
non-appropriations bills from "sections or items" to "entire sections"
of those bills. The governor's item veto power was restricted to
23. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
24. 55 Wash. 2d 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960), overruled, Washington Fed'n of State Employees
v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984).
25. The governor vetoed the words "Governor, twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars."
Id. at 556, 348 P.2d at 972.
26. Id. The delegates at the state constitutional convention rejected a motion to restrict the
item veto to appropriations bills. JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 576. However, the court did not
make reference to legislative history in support of its holding.
27. Burke, supra note 22, at 606.
28. See, e.g., Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 88 Wash. 2d 563, 564 P.2d
788 (1977) (discussed infra note 65), overruled, Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State,
101 Wash. 2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984).
29. Burke, supra note 22, at 607 & table at 616.
30. WASH. CONsT. amend. LXII (emphasis added). The House rejected a draft that would
have allowed the governor to disapprove a portion of an act, except when deleting the portion
would alter the meaning of the remainder of the act, or to disapprove monetary items. 1974
HOUSE JOURNAL, 3d Ex. Sess. 3911, 3966.
Vol. 64:891, 1989
Item Veto in Washington
"appropriation items."3 The legislative history suggests that the leg-
islature wanted to restrict the exercise of the item veto power to its
pre-Ruoff use.3 2
III. WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE AND GUBERNATORIAL
PRACTICES
A. Appropriations Process and Appropriations Bill Drafting
Evaluation of the practical impact of Washington governors' use of
the item veto power since passage of the 62nd amendment requires an
understanding of the appropriations process and appropriations bill
drafting. The appropriations process begins with the preparation and
submittal of a budget and a budget bill by the governor.33 The budget
bill goes through a committee hearing and amendment process where
the legislature may increase, decrease, or eliminate specific budget
requests. The legislature also attaches one or more provisos-clauses
directing for what purposes and under what conditions appropriations
must be spent-to most appropriations.3 4 Once the bill passes both
houses, it is sent to the governor, who may exercise the item veto
power.
The Washington legislature structures appropriations bills so that
each executive agency and constitutional officer receives a lump sum
appropriation.36 At the beginning of each section of an appropriations
bill, the legislature designates the sources of the funds and combines
them to produce a total appropriation for a particular agency or con-
stitutional officer. 37 This lump sum total is usually subject to condi-
tions set forth in one or more provisos, with each proviso constituting
31. The amendment also extended the time for the governor to consider veto of bills from 10
to 20 days if adjournment prevented return of the bill, and empowered the legislature to convene
a special session within 45 days of adjournment solely to reconsider vetoed bills. WASH. CONST.
amend. LXII.
32. "[W]hat we are trying to accomplish is to restore the veto power to the governor as it was
understood up until 1959. Up until 1959 it was understood that he could veto appropriation
items, but . . . it was upheld, in the Ruoff case . . . that 'items' meant a comma, a word,
anything." 1974 SENATE JOURNAL, 3d Ex. Sess. 89 (remarks of Sen. Grant).
33. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.88.030, .060, .090 (1987) (prescribing process for development
of executive agency budget requests and timeline for submittal of the budget to the legislature).
34. See Operating Budget, ch. 7, § 201(1)(a)-(e), 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 2670, 2682.
35. WASH. CONsT. art. III, § 12.
36. Eg., Operating Budget, ch. 7, §§ 101-149, 602-616, 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 2670,
2671-82, 2743-47. Appropriations for the Department of Social and Health Services and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction are broken down by program, but these programs are as big
as other entire agencies. See id. §§ 202-216, 501-522, 1987 Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. at 2683-99,
2718-38.
37. See, eg., id. § 129, 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. at 2679.
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a subsection.38 With rare exception,39 the lump sum totals are not
itemized.'
The Washington legislature's appropriations bills differ from those
of many states where appropriations bills resemble budgets4t and are
highly detailed.42 The amount of detail in other states's appropriation
bills is often a constitutional requirement.43 In New York, the legisla-
ture cannot condense items in the governor's budget bill into lump
sums.' The New York Constitution prohibits the legislature from
altering the governor's budget bill except to strike or reduce items or
to add new items.45 The Louisiana Constitution explicitly mandates
itemization.46 In California, a statute provides that the state budget
bill must be patterned after the governor's budget.47
B. Recent Use of the Item Veto
Recent Washington governors have interpreted the term "appropri-
ation item" in the 62nd amendment to mean any proviso that is
attached to a lump sum appropriation, including apportionments,
48
38. See id. § 201(1)(a)-(e), 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. at 2682.
39. See id. § 201, 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. at 2682-83 (State Department of
Corrections appropriation comprised four line items).
40. The institutional justification for this practice is unrecorded. Interview with Bob
Longman, Senior Counsel, House Fiscal Committee (Mar. 8, 1989) (notes on file with
Washington Law Review).
41. E.g., Budget Act of 1987, ch. 35, 1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. 163 (West); Act approved June
29, 1988, ch. 88-555, 1988 Fla. Laws 2447; Act of May 13, 1988, ch. 399, 1987 Wis. Laws 1541.
42. Compare Act of May 13, 1988, ch. 399, § 20.370, 1987 Wis. Laws at 1552-77
(appropriation for Wisconsin Department of Environmental Resources comprised over 200 line
items) and Act approved June 29, 1988, ch. 88-555, § 01, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2454-67
(appropriation for Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services subdivided into
146 line items) with Operating Budget, ch. 7, § 303, 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. at 2708-09
($133,578,000 lump sum appropriation for the Washington Department of Ecology) and id.
§ 313, 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. at 2713-14 ($19,532,000 lump sum appropriation for
Washington's Department of Agriculture).
43. Fourteen state constitutions mandate that appropriations bills contain only
appropriations. ITEM VETO REPORT, supra note 1, at 255-57 (app. C-5).
44. People v. Tremaine, 257 A.D. 117, 13 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1939).
45. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
46. "The general appropriations bill shall be itemized .... " LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c).
47. CAL. GOVT CODE ANN. § 13338 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
48. An apportionment is a proviso that specifies how a portion of the lump sum appropriation
is to be spent. E.g., Operating Budget, ch. 7, § 201(l)(a), 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 2670,
2682 ("$23,884,000 is provided solely for the operation and/or contracting with nonprofit
corporations for work training release for convicted felons.").
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spending caps,4 9 reporting requirements," ° and other conditions and
restrictions."1 They also have vetoed phrases and sentence fragments
within provisos. 2
The governors have treated vetoes of apportionments in a contradic-
tory fashion, sometimes asserting that the dollar amount contained in
the vetoed apportionment still was available for use by the agency 53 or
constitutional officer,54 and at other times asserting that the apportion-
ment lapsed." Governor Gardner assumes that if he requested the
apportioned amount for other purposes, the veto allows the agency to
use the funds pursuant to his original wishes rather than the wishes of
the legislature. 6 If the apportionment contained funding not antici-
pated by the Governor, the agency that received the apportioned funds
49. !-g., Supplemental Budget, ch. 312, § 201(2)(f), 1986 Wash. Laws 1379, 1388 ("A
maximum of $500,000 of the general fund-state appropriation may be spent for the operation of
the Firlands Corrections Center.").
50. E.g., Operating Budget, ch. 7, §§ 121(2)-(3), 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 2670, 2677
(the Governor vetoed reporting requirement imposed by the legislature on the Office of Financial
Management).
51. Kg., Supplemental Budget, ch. 312, § 207, 1986 Wash. Laws 1379, 1401 (the vetoed
proviso prohibited expenditures by the Washington Department of Social and Health Services for
materials on homosexual sex safety).
52. Kg., Supplemental Operating Budget, ch. 289, § 401(5), 1988 Wash. Laws 1398, 1452.
The legislature apportioned $300,000 to establish a separate unit within the state patrol for major
crimes investigation. Governor Gardner vetoed the phrase "to establish a separate unit" but left
the remainder of the apportionment language intact. Id.
53. In 1981, the legislature apportioned the entire lump sum for the Department of
Commerce and Economic Development. State Operating Budget, ch. 340, § 80(1)-(5), 1981
Wash. Laws 1612, 1656. Governor Spellman vetoed all five apportionments, explaining that the
apportionment language did not provide the Department with sufficient programmatic flexibility.
Id., 1981 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. at 1687 (veto message). The Governor obviously treated this
money as if it were still available for Department use; otherwise, the Department would not have
existed during the 1981-83 biennium.
54. In 1987, the legislature appropriated $3,400,000 to the Superintendent of Public
Instruction for educational clinics that work with dropouts. Operating Budget, ch. 7, § 515,
1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 2670, 2736-37. Governor Gardner vetoed an apportionment that
stated: "$635,000 is provided solely to extend services to counties that were not served by
educational clinics during the 1985-87 fiscal biennium." Id. § 515(2), 1987 Wash. Laws, Ist Ex.
Sess. at 2737. The Governor's veto message concluded, "I encourage the Superintendent to use
the funds available as a result of my action for distribution to the existing clinics." Id., 1987
Wash. Laws, .1st Ex. Sess. at 2768.
55. E.g., Supplemental Operating Budget, ch. 289, § 306(10), 1988 Wash. Laws 1398, 1444,
1499 (Governor Gardner vetoed a $125,000 apportionment of an appropriation for the
Department of Fisheries. The Governor's veto message stated that he would ask the Department
to return the money to the general fund).
"'Lapse' means the termination of the authority to expend an appropriation." WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.88.020(13) (1987).
56. Interview with Terry Sebring, Counsel to the Governor for the State of Washington (Mar.
7, 1989) (notes on file with Washington Law Review).
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proposes other uses for the funds to the Governor.57 The decision how
the funds will be used is made outside of public scrutiny. 8
IV. SCOPE OF THE ITEM VETO POWER
Recent use of the item veto in Washington raises a number of issues:
Can the governor's veto of provisos be called the veto of "appropria-
tion items"; and can the governor allow agencies and constitutional
officers to use vetoed apportionments? Court decisions shed some
light on these and other issues.
A. Washington Case Law Construing Article II1, Section 12
1. Semantic Tests of Validity: The Affirmative-Negative and
Separate Subject Tests
Until recently, the Washington Supreme Court has displayed little
propensity to interpret carefully the language of article III, section
12." Instead, the court has employed two tests to determine if the
vetoed part of a bill was a section or an item: the affirmative-negative
test and the separate subject test.60
At times the court has limited the governor's veto power through
application of the affirmative-negative test. Under this test, the gover-
nor may use the section or item veto power in a negative or destructive
manner, but may not use the power in an affirmative or creative way
that would achieve a result different from that intended by the
legislature.6"
The court first applied the affirmative-negative test in Cascade Tele-
phone Co. v. State Tax Commission.62 In Cascade, the court upheld
the governor's veto of a section of an excise tax bill that permitted
57. Id.
58. Occasionally, the governor states in his veto message how a vetoed apportionment will be
used. See supra notes 54-55. However, after the end of a legislative session, the governor's staff
has only 20 days minus Sundays to decide what should be vetoed. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.
Thereafter, negotiations with the agencies commence. Thus, the decision how to use the money
is usually made long after the time limit to exercise the item veto. Interview with Terry Sebring,
supra note 56.
59. Note, Washington's Partial Veto Power: Judicial Construction of Article III, Section 12, 10
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 699, 699-700 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 88 Wash. 2d 563, 566, 564 P.2d 788,
791 (1977).
62. 176 Wash. 616, 30 P.2d 976 (1934), overruled, Washington Fed'n of State Employees v.
State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984). Later cases cite Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v.
Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316 (1910), as authority for Washington's adoption of the
affirmative-negative test. E.g., Evans, 88 Wash. 2d at 566, 564 P.2d at 791. The court, however,
disposed of Lyttaker on other grounds. See Note, supra note 59, at 703 n.21.
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certain types of businesses to pass on the tax burden to the con-
sumer.63 The court summarily ruled that the governor's veto would
stand because it was negative rather than affirmative. 64 Two dissent-
ing justices disagreed, arguing that the governor completely reversed
legislative intent by imposing the tax on the distributor rather than the
consumer.
65
Although the affimative-negative test was applied to both item and
section vetoes, the court developed an additional test-the separate
subject test-to determine the validity of the section veto. This test
was first used in Cascade, where the governor vetoed a portion of a bill
designated as a section by the legislature.66 Although the court could
have relied on the ordinary meaning of "section" to uphold the veto, it
held instead that "section" had more to do with subject matter than
with legislative divisions. 67 The governor could veto any language
that constituted a "separate, distinct, and ... independent" subject.68
Otherwise, the legislature could circumscribe the veto power through
"artful arrangement of the subject matter and an arbitrary division
into sections." 69
2. Post-Amendment Abandonment of the Semantic Tests
The two semantic tests produced confusing and unpredictable
results.70 Moreover, the court sometimes applied only one test,71 at
63. 176 Wash. at 617-18, 621, 30 P.2d at 977-78.
64. Id. at 620, 30 P.2d at 978.
65. Id. at 622, 30 P.2d at 978 (Steinert, J., dissenting). The court applied the affirmative-
negative test in several cases prior to passage of the 62nd amendment. E.g., Evans, 88 Wash. 2d
at 566-73, 564 P.2d at 791-94 (the governor had excised 14 phrases and sentence fragments from
the Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973. The court found 13 of the vetoes to be invalid affirmative
vetoes because they expanded tenant rights and increased landlord obligations).
66. 176 Wash. at 618, 30 P.2d at 977.
67. Id. at 619, 30 P.2d at 977.
68. Id. at 620, 30 P.2d at 977.
69. Id. at 619, 30 P.2d at 977; see also Evans, 88 Wash. 2d at 568-69, 564 P.2d at 792
(attempted veto of a sentence fragment of the 1973 Landlord-Tenant Act held not a separate
subject).
70. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 545-46, 682 P.2d 869,
874 (1984) (lack of clarity in applying affirmative-negative test); Note, supra note 59, at 714-16
(documenting difficulty in applying separate subject test).
71. In Hallin v. Trent, 94 Wash. 2d 671, 673, 619 P.2d 357, 358 (1980), overruled,
Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984), the
governor vetoed a section making new judicial positions elected rather than appointed. The
court did not apply the separate subject test, and upheld the veto as a "negative" use of the veto
power. Id. at 678, 619 P.2d at 360.
899
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other times both,72 and sometimes neither.73 Following the adoption
of the 62nd amendment, the Washington Supreme Court decided sev-
eral disputes over the use of the section veto on non-appropriations
bills. After initially relying on its semantic tests, 74 the court aban-
doned both tests in favor of a literal construction of the language of
the 62nd amendment.
The court renounced the affirmative-negative test in 1984 in Wash-
ington Federation of State Employees v. State.75 In State Employees,
the legislature had amended state civil service laws. The governor
vetoed a section that called for legislative review and approval of pro-
posed administrative rules implementing the act.76 The court held
that the governor's veto was a valid veto of an entire section.77 The
court disavowed the affirmative-negative test, asserting that the con-
cept was unworkable and that its use sanctioned judicial intrusion into
the legislative branch in derogation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 8
The court abandoned the separate subject test in Washington State
Motorcycle Dealers Association v. State.7 9 Governor Gardner had
vetoed certain language in a number of sections and subsections of the
Motorcycle Dealers Franchise Act. Relying on the plain language of
the 62nd amendment, the court literally construed "entire sections" to
mean sections as labeled by the legislature.8" The court then expressly
disavowed the separate subject test, reasoning that the clear language
of the 62nd amendment obviated the need for semantic tests of
validity.81
While the Motorcycle Dealers decision resolved the question of what
constitutes a section of a non-appropriations bill, an equally important
question remains. Specifically, what is the extent of the governor's
72. E.g., Evans, 88 Wash. 2d at 566-73, 564 P.2d at 791-94.
73. E.g., State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 55 Wash. 2d 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960); see supra
notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
74. After adoption of the 62nd amendment, the court employed each test one time. See
Hallin, 94 Wash. 2d at 678, 619 P.2d at 360 (applying affirmative-negative test); Fain v.
Chapman, 94 Wash. 2d 684, 689, 619 P.2d 353, 356 (1980) (applying separate subject test),
overruled, Washington State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, I ll Wash. 2d 667, 763 P.2d 442
(1988).
75. 101 Wash. 2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984).
76. Id. at 537-38, 682 P.2d at 870 (quoting 1982 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. at 1511).
77. Id. at 544, 682 P.2d at 873.
78. Id. at 546, 682 P.2d at 874.
79. 111 Wash. 2d 667, 763 P.2d 442 (1988).
80. The majority's reasoning, that "entire section" means entire section, begged the question.
However, the inference can be drawn that the court construed "entire section" to mean sections
as designated by the legislature. Id. at 670-76, 763 P.2d at 443-46.
81. Id. at 679, 763 P.2d at 448.
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item veto power? No Washington case law defines "appropriation
item" or discusses the extent of this power. Thus, to resolve an item
veto dispute, the court might need to look to other jurisdictions for
guidance.
B. Case Law on the Item Veto Power in Other Jurisdictions
In other jurisdictions, courts have played a major role in defining
what is a proper exercise of the item veto power. Uniform constitu-
tional interpretation has been complicated, however, by the variation
among state constitutional item veto provisions.82 Nonetheless, some
recurrent themes have emerged.
1. What Is an Appropriation?
Most state constitutions limit the item veto power to items "of
appropriation"83 or to "appropriation bills."84 In construing these
provisions, courts often face two related and seemingly unambiguous
questions: What types of funding mechanisms constitute "appropria-
tions," and what constitutes appropriation legislation that is subject to
the item veto?
The first question requires courts to distinguish among various legis-
lative funding methods. An oft-quoted definition of an appropriation
is "the setting aside from the public revenue of a certain sum of money
for a specified object, in such manner that the executive officers of the
government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that
object, and no other."8" This definition has two critical parts. First,
an appropriation is an authorization to spend money, not a process or
mechanism by which revenue is raised. Thus, in State ex rel. Finnegan
v. Dammann,86 the Wisconsin Supreme Court invoked this definition
to nullify the governor's attempted veto of a portion of a revenue bill
that created revenues to be deposited in a revolving fund. Second, an
appropriation is an allocation of funding from public revenue. The
Alaska Supreme Court, in Thomas v. Rosen,87 seized upon this portion
of the definition to void the attempted item veto of a proposed bond
82. See supra note 1; infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
83. g., ARIZ. CoNsT. art. 5, § 7.
84. Kg., ALAsKA CONST. art II, § 15.
85. State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622, 624 (1936) (quoting
Hunt v. Callaghan, 32 Ariz. 235, 257 P. 648, 649 (1927)).
86. lId
87. 569 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1977).
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issue. The court distinguished debt financing from an allocation of
state general or special fund monies.88
The second recurrent question is what constitutes appropriation leg-
islation subject to the item veto? Generally, appropriations can be
found in three types of bills: general appropriations bills,89 special
appropriations bills,90 and acts of general legislation that contain an
incidental appropriation to carry out the purposes of the act.9 t
Where constitutions limit the item veto to "appropriations bills,"
the general rule is that only a bill "the primary and specific aim of
which is to make appropriations of money from the public treasury,"92
meaning a general or special appropriations bill, is subject to item
veto. General legislation containing only one item of appropriation
cannot be item vetoed. 93 This general rule has been applied both to
item vetoes of substantive law94 and of appropriations language95
within non-appropriations bills. Some courts have adopted the major-
ity rule despite broader constitutional language. 96 Others have
adopted the majority rule despite narrower constitutional language.97
88. Id. at 796. The court also noted that because the bond issue was subject to voter
approval, executive interference in the referendum process violated separation of powers. Id. at
796-97.
89. E.g., Operating Budget, ch. 7, 1987 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 2670.
90. E.g., Transportation Budget, ch. 10, 1987 Wash. Laws 2789.
91. E.g., Retirement Cost of Living Adjustments, ch. 455, §§ 7-8, 1987 Wash. Laws 1964,
1968 (act contained two incidental appropriations to carry out its purpose of providing for
retirement cost-of-living adjustments).
92. Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1937) (construing the power of the
Governor-General of the Philippines to veto "any particular item or items of an appropriation
bill").
93. Id. at 413.
94. Id. at 411-12, 416 (nullifying an attempted veto of a provision that made justices of the
peace eligible for retirement gratuities).
95. Opinion of the Justices, 349 Mass. 804, 212 N.E. 2d 562, 566-67 (1965).
96. The Idaho Constitution grants the governor the power to disapprove of items in "any bill
making appropriations of money ...." IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 11. Despite this broader
wording, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in dicta that this provision would not apply to
general legislation containing one appropriation to implement the purposes of an act. Cenarrusa
v. Andrus, 99 Idaho 404, 582 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1978).
97. The Florida governor "may veto any specific appropriation in a general appropriation bill
. .FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a). Although this language seems to exclude special
appropriations bills, the court in Thompson v. Graham, 481 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 1985),
upheld the item veto of a bill that appropriated funds solely for public education capital outlay
projects. The plurality reasoned that any other reading "would have a chilling effect on [the]
balance of power." Id. at 1215. Two dissenters argued that the language referred only to the
general appropriations bill that authorizes funds for salaries of public officers and state expenses.
Id. at 1220 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
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Finally, the minority view is that the item veto can be used on any bill
containing an appropriation.98
2. What Is an Item?
For roughly a century, state courts have agonized over what is an
"item" of appropriation.99 The problem of interpretation is compli-
cated by the varied language of constitutional item veto provisions,
which restrict the governor's power to veto "items"'" or "parts"10' of
appropriations bills, or to some combination of these terms.
10 2
Although most decisions rest upon the court's interpretation of the
separation of powers doctrine, the decisions diverge in assessing when
the doctrine is violated.
The most troublesome question courts confront in determining the
scope of the item veto power is whether the governor may veto
provisos that contain conditions and restrictions directing how appro-
priated monies must be spent. The majority view limits the executive's
item veto power to the veto of money items.103 Conditions or restric-
tions placed on the appropriation items by the legislature are linked
inextricably to those money items and cannot be vetoed while leaving
the item intact." 4  The rationale for this narrow view is that removal
of conditions and restrictions supplants the governor's intent with that
of the legislature in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
10 5
This narrow view has been modified, often by application of seman-
tic tests of validity. The New Mexico Supreme Court applied the
"affirmative-negative" test to validate vetoes of provisos only when
legislative intent is not altered. 1 6 The Iowa Supreme Court developed
a "separate and severable" test.10 7 While affirming the general rule
98. In Dickson v. Saiz, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205, 207-10 (1957), the New Mexico Supreme
Court, relying on language in the New Mexico constitution that extends the item veto to "any
bill appropriating money," upheld the item veto of several substantive provisions of an act that
permitted liquor sales on Sundays.
99. State v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158, 23 So. 643 (1898).
100. Eg., ARIZ. CONsT. art. 5, § 7.
101. Eg., WIs. CONsT. art. V., § 10.
102. Eg., MASS. CONST. art. 63, § 5.
103. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120, 127 (1940).
104. Id
105. Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 214 P. 319, 322 (1923).
106. In State ex reL Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975, 981-85 (1974), the court
struck down six "affirmative" vetoes, but upheld the veto of a proviso requiring a government
commission to maintain a $4,000 annual reserve in a revolving fund. The court reasoned that the
veto did not change the purpose of the fund. Id at 983-84. The court did not discuss whether the
revolving fund was an "appropriation."
107. Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 714 (Iowa 1975).
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that provisos are not subject to removal, the court purports to distin-
guish provisos which are integral parts of the appropriation, and not
subject to veto, from those which are nonessential. ° 8  Likewise,
Louisiana adopted an "appropriateness test" under which the gover-
nor cannot veto "legitimate" or "appropriate" conditions without also
vetoing the money item to which the restriction relates.1 09 If, how-
ever, the legislature attempts to circumvent the item veto power
through "artful drafting" of substantive measures designed to look like
"true" conditions, such provisions are treated as items subject to
veto. 1 0
Two states have abandoned outright the general rule that the item
veto does not extend to provisos. In Karcher v. Kean,"' the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that conditions and restrictions are
unequivocally the subject of gubernatorial item vetoes. The court in
Karcher asserted that the governor was empowered to exercise the
item veto on any subject matter in an appropriations bill that is
broadly related to the state's fiscal affairs.112 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, in State ex. reL Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson,' 13 held that
the Wisconsin governor can veto sections, subsections, paragraphs,
sentences, words, parts of words, letters, digits, and even punctuation
marks in an appropriations bill, as long as what remains is a workable
law. The Wisconsin court upheld all 290 of the governor's vetoes, even
where he struck the digit "1" from a $150,000 appropriation. 14
In summary, cases from other jurisdictions primarily address the
definitions of "appropriation" and "item." Many holdings show a
108. Compare Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Iowa 1985) (rider in an
appropriation bill is a separable item subject to veto) with Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479, 483
(Iowa 1985) (provisions in five bills prohibiting transfer of appropriated funds between
departments were qualifications, not separable items).
109. Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 157 (La. 1977).
110. Id. at 158. The rationale for this rule is the preservation of the item veto power and the
maintenance of the balance of power between the legislature and the executive. Id. The court
adopted this position despite the narrow language of the Louisiana Constitution: "[T]he governor
may veto any line item in an appropriation bill." LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(G) (emphasis added).
111. 97 N.J. 483, 479 A.2d 403 (1984).
112. 479 A.2d at 416. The court reasoned that this holding was necessary to avoid the
stalemate that might otherwise ensue if the governor were required to veto the entire
appropriation, and was consistent with the need for a balanced budget. Id.
113. 144 Wis. 2d 429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988).
114. 424 N.W.2d at 396. Three factors influenced the court: First, the Wisconsin
Constitution allows the governor to object to appropriation bills "in whole or in part"; second,
five earlier Wisconsin cases broadly construed the governor's veto power; and third, unlike most
other states, Wisconsin has no "one subject per bill" rule; thus, the governor needs greater
leverage to counteract legislative logrolling. Id. at 388-96.
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judicial propensity for subjective decisionmaking based on the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. Others rely on construction of the language
of the particular constitutional provision. The most contentious issue
has also been the most nebulous: Can the governor veto a proviso
without vetoing the appropriation to which it relates? This issue
remains unresolved in Washington.
V.' RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM IN WASHINGTON
Use of the item veto in Washington has been fraught with separa-
tion of powers problems. Washington governors have used the item
veto to eliminate any language within an appropriation bill that
restricts the use of funds.115 They also have assumed that when the
legislature apportions a specific amount for a particular purpose, the
apportionment language can be vetoed and the funds used at the gov-
ernor's discretion." 6 The decision whether these funds lapse or are
used for another purpose is made outside of public scrutiny. Unfortu-
nately, the legislature has never challenged these practices.
Washington's item veto power also has been ineffective in achieving
spending reductions. Two factors inhibit effective use of the item veto
in saving money: First, the Washington legislature has blunted the
governor's effective use of the item veto power by drafting appropria-
tion bills that are not itemized;17 second, Washington governors have
treated Vetoed apportionments as if the money is still available for use.
For Washington's item veto power to be used as a tool for fiscal
restraint, rather than a vehicle through which governors alter legisla-
tive intent, two changes must occur. First, the scope of the item veto
power should be defined and narrowed to allow elimination only of
money items. The impetus for this change must come from the legisla-
ture, because the governor is unlikely to push for a reduction in the
scope of the item veto power. The legislature could accomplish this
redefinition either through a court challenge, more frequent use of the
veto override, or adoption of a constitutional amendment. Second, the
legislature should draft itemized appropriations bills in order to permit
the use of the item veto in reducing expenditures.
115. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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A. Proposed Methods to Limit the Scope of Item Veto Power
1. Court Challenge
A court challenge to the governor's use of the item veto would raise
questions of constitutional construction and legislative intent that
were not presented in the section veto cases. Although the legislature
subdivides its bills and labels these subdivisions "sections," appropria-
tions bills do not label appropriation items. In construing the term
"appropriation item," the Washington Supreme Court should not
revive semantic tests used in the section veto cases.1 18 Instead, the
court should continue its effort to discern the meaning of the language
of the 62nd amendment in conformity with the intent of the legislature
and the voters who adopted the amendment.
The first issue that may arise in a court challenge is what is an
appropriation? This issue comprises two sub-issues: First, what type
of legislative funding mechanisms are appropriations; and second,
what type of legislation is subject to the item veto? The legislative
history of the 62nd amendment provides no guidance on the first sub-
issue. The majority rule in other states is that an appropriation is an
authorization to spend public revenues. 1 9 The crux of this definition
is that, whatever a funding mechanism is called, 2° only those public
funds subject to legislative authorization are appropriations. 2 1
This narrow definition of "appropriation" probably would be
adopted by the Washington Supreme Court. The court narrowly con-
strued "entire section" in Motorcycle Dealers.122 It follows that the
court should also adopt a narrow definition of "appropriation." Thus,
the item veto power should extend only to expressions of legislative
spending authorization that are made through the biennial appropria-
tions process.
The legislative history of the 62nd amendment does address what
constitutes appropriation legislation. The final floor colloquy just
before passage of the amendment established that the governor can
118. Such tests constitute judicial intrusion on the legislative branch in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d
536, 546, 682 P.2d 869, 874 (1984).
119. State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622, 624 (1936).
120. In Washington, many types of funds are loosely termed "revolving funds."
Expenditures from some of these funds cannot be made without biennial legislative
authorization. Others are not subject to legislative appropriation. See STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATUTE LAW COMMITTEE, BILL DRAFTING GUIDE 19 (1989).
121. Accord Board of Regents v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323, 1331 (1975).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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exercise the item veto on any bill containing an appropriation, not just
appropriations bills.123
Probably the most difficult question is what constitutes an item
under the 62nd amendment. Most of the legislative history of the
62nd amendment comprises debate over two issues: Can the governor
veto provisos containing conditions and restrictions on appropriations,
and if a proviso contains apportionment language, will the veto reduce
the lump sum appropriation accordingly?124 Early senate debate sup-
plied more than one interpretation.1 25 However, in a carefully orches-
trated colloquy just before final passage, Senators Grant and Lewis-
the same two senators who had disagreed earlier-concurred on the
meaning of the amendment. 126  The intent of the legislature, as
expressed in this colloquy, was that the governor could not veto lan-
guage that is less than a section, except for the appropriation
amount.127 The senators also agreed that "appropriation item" meant
"a dollar amount." 121
The implication is that the legislature intended to prevent the gover-
nor from vetoing any proviso that does not contain an apportionment.
Provisos that contain spending caps, reporting requirements, and
other conditions, but which do not contain "appropriation amounts,"
cannot be vetoed. One can perhaps draw a contrary inference from
the fact that the legislature never has challenged a Washington gover-
nor's veto of provisos. 129 The lack of court challenges might evidence
123. "[The governor] can veto appropriations amounts out of a main budget bill or out of any
bill that has an appropriation attached to it, but he cannot... veto any.., language that is less
than a section, except for the appropriation itself." 1974 SENATE JOURNAL, 3d Ex. Sess. at 116
(remarks of Sen. Grant) (emphasis added).
124. 1974 SENATE JOURNAL, 3d Ex. Sess. at 88-91, 116.
125. Id. at 89.
126. Id. at 116 (remarks of Sens. Lewis and Grant).
127. Senator Lewis (Harry): "In the event an appropriation bill had a proviso in it which
proviso would be less than a full section, would you clarify the intent of this constitutional
amendment as to the right of the governor to veto that proviso or an amount within the
proviso ... T'
Senator Grant: "It is my understanding and it is our intent, the intent of the sponsors of this
measure, that he could not veto less than an entire section, a proviso that was less than an
entire section, except for the appropriations amount."
Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
128. "Senator Dore: ... 'When referring to appropriation item in the bill you are talking
about a dollar amount. Isn't that correct?'
Senator Grant: 'That is correct, Senator.'" Id. at 116.
129. Several months after voters approved passage of the 62nd amendment, the legislature
adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution 122 (1975), reprinted in PRINTED BILLS OF THE
LEGISLATURE, 44TH SESSION [hereinafter SCR 122], which provided for the employment of
counsel to challenge the governor's 1975 item vetoes. SCR 122 asserted that the governor's veto
of "conditions, provisos, restrictions, and other limitations," without also vetoing the
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a vested legislative interest in the governor's current use of the item
veto power.' 30 However, the lack of challenges probably is due more
to legislative inertia than to support for the governor's item vetoes.' 3'
The legislative history is less clear on whether "item" refers to the
dollar amount within the proviso, the lump sum total appropriation,
or both. Probably the best interpretation of the senate debate132 is that
"item" means any appropriation amount, whether that amount is the
entire lump sum appropriation or an apportionment. Several consid-
erations support this conclusion. First, most appropriations are made
in one lump sum per section. To interpret "item" to mean only the
total dollar amount at the beginning of a legislatively designated sec-
tion would make the term meaningless, as the governor can already
veto that dollar amount by vetoing the entire section.
Second, one of the main concerns of the members was that the gov-
ernor should not be able to veto an apportionment without also veto-
ing the amount apportioned. t 33 This interpretation finds further
support in Senate Concurrent Resolution 122 ("SCR 122"), drafted
just a year later. Sponsored by Senator Lewis, one of the participants
in the key Senate colloquy,' 34 SCR 122 asserted that the intent of the
legislature was to prohibit the governor from vetoing a proviso con-
taining conditions or limitations without also vetoing the dollar
amount contained therein. 3 1
Finally, the legislature was not the only body politic to vote on the
62nd amendment. The people of Washington State ultimately
approved its passage. It is doubtful that the people intended to leave
the governor with the stark choice of approving a lump sum appropri-
ation or vetoing this amount, thereby allowing the affected agency or
office to go without funds for an entire year. This is especially true
appropriated dollar amount, was prohibited by the 62nd amendment. Id. Although the
legislature hired counsel, it never brought suit.
130. After each legislative session, legislators publicly and privately request the governor to
veto provisos. Some of these requests are for vetoes which correct mistakes made during the
recently completed legislative session. But other requests come from legislators who had
previously agreed to an unwanted proviso in order to pass the appropriations bill. Interview with
Terry Sebring, supra note 56.
131. This inertia is evidenced by the section veto challenges. Those actions were brought by
affected industries; thereafter, the legislature intervened. E.g., Washington State Motorcycle
Dealers Ass'n v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 667, 669, 763 P.2d 442, 443 (1988). In the item veto
setting, the directly affected party is most often an executive agency. No party outside the
legislature is likely to bring suit.
132. See supra notes 127-28.
133. 1974 SENATE JOURNAL, 3d Ex. Sess. at 89 (remarks of Sen. Day).
134. See supra note 127.
135. SCR 122, supra note 129.
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because the Official Voters Pamphlet described the amendment as a
"moderate compromise." 136
2. Veto Override
In Washington, item vetoes have acquired an absolute character.
Although the 62nd amendment authorized the legislature to convene a
special session specifically to challenge section and item vetoes, 137 the
legislature never has convened such a session. The non-use of veto
overrides suggests two questions: Has the legislature acquiesced in the
governor's use of the item veto; and should the legislature, in lieu of
initiating a court challenge, use the veto override power more
frequently?
Lack of veto overrides cannot be equated with legislative acquies-
cence in recent use of the item veto power. At least three practical
difficulties prohibit more frequent overrides. Chief among these diffi-
culties is the two-thirds supermajority of each house necessary to carry
a veto override.1 38 When using the item veto, the governor, in effect,
acts as a superlegislator who needs only one-third of the votes of one
house of the legislature to pass legislation. 139 Second, once a veto is
exercised, the override issue is more complex than legislature versus
governor: it is an issue of party loyalty. 1" Thus, even if both houses of
the legislature are controlled by the opposing party, the governor's
veto likely will be upheld. Finally, because many bills are passed near
the end of the session, the legislature usually has adjourned by the
time the governor exercises the veto. After adjournment, it becomes
difficult to recall the members. 141
These same considerations also argue against more frequent use of
the veto override in the future. It is unrealistic to expect the legisla-
ture to override item vetoes more frequently in lieu of restricting the
scope of the item veto power through a court challenge.142 Once the
136. STATEMENT FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 140, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET
(General Election 1974).
137. WASH. CONST. amend. LXII; see supra note 31.
138. See WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12.
139. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 536, 551, 682 P.2d 869,
877 (1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
140. ITEM VETO REPORT, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting H. GRIFFIN, THE POLITICS OF THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA, 1965-1971, at 257 (Ph.D. diss., UCLA) (1976)).
141. The experience of other states is similar. Most bills passed by state legislatures have
little or no opposition; yet legislatures rarely override the governor's veto. Prescott, The
Executive Veto in American States, 3 W. POL. Q. 98, 111 (1950).
142. The Washington Supreme Court has previously expressed some reluctance to get
involved and has suggested that the legislature should use its veto override power if it disagrees
with the governor. See State Employees, 101 Wash. 2d at 547, 682 P.2d at 875. However, by
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scope of the item veto power is defined, however, the onus falls upon
the legislature to override vetoes that are exercised within the purview
of the constitution.
3. Constitutional Amendment
If the court affirmed the governor's power to veto provisos, or to
veto apportionment language without deleting the apportioned
amount, the legislature could again seek to amend the constitution.
Such an amendment should clarify that the governor could not veto
provisos, except for apportionments, and that the veto of apportion-
ment language causes the apportioned amount to lapse. 143 A constitu-
tional amendment would, however, be a cumbersome way of effecting
change. Passage would require a two-thirds majority of each house
and the approval of voters." Thus, amending the constitution should
be viewed as a last resort.
B. Proposed Changes in Appropriations Bill Drafting
For fifteen years since the passage of the 62nd amendment, the legis-
lature has continued to draft appropriations bills with little or no
apparent regard for the item veto. If the item veto is to serve its pri-
mary purpose-the reduction of unnecessary expenditures-appropri-
ation bills must be drafted with sufficient detail for the governor to
have "line items" to veto. The current format of appropriating lump
sums and attaching provisos does not serve this purpose; this format
blunts the Washington governor's ability to use the item veto for its
worthwhile purpose. Effective use of the item veto requires
itemization. 145
The "bow wave" phenomenon-the impact of programs that are
only partially begun in one biennium and cost more when fully imple-
mented in the subsequent biennium 146-illustrates the importance of
refusing to hear such cases, the court would abdicate its role as interpreter of the constitution.
Moreover, the legislature should not be forced to override item vetoes of questionable
constitutional validity. Note, supra note 59, at 719.
143. The following language could be added after the crucial language of article III, section
12 (see supra text accompanying note 30): "The term appropriation item does not include any
language that is a condition or restriction on the use of an appropriated amount, unless such
language specifies that a portion of the appropriated amount may only be spent for a particular
purpose. A vetoed appropriation item shall lapse."
144. WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § I.
145. One study documented substantial savings in Illinois, California, and Pennsylvania. See
AEI STUDY, supra note 7, at 17-18. Appropriations bills in these states, however, are itemized.
These states also allow their governors to reduce items. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(b); ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 9(d); Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 48 A. 976, 979 (1901).
146. BUDGET IN BRIEF, 1989-1991 BIENNIUM ii (1988).
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allowing the governor to veto line items. Legislators tend to think in
two-year cycles, related to their terms of office; however, salary raises
and programs that begin late in the current biennium continue beyond
legislators' tenure.147 The governor, who is elected by the entire state
for a four-year term, is better able to see where budget excesses could
produce a bow wave that will have a dramatic future impact.
Itemization also could allow the legislature to gain more control
over appropriations. The legislature could present the governor with
concrete choices by itemizing appropriations and stating that "totals
are for illustrative purposes only and are not part of the law." '48 In
this way, if the governor vetoed an item, the funds would lapse.1 49
Opponents who may argue that such itemization would unduly limit
the governor's flexibility ignore the fact that Washington's governor
drafts the budget and plays the primary role in constructing the
budget bill. Moreover, the governor's power to strike unnecessary
appropriations will increase with increased itemization. The gover-
nor's key role in the formulation of the budget bill and the availability
of more items to veto compensate for limits on flexibility.
In summary, the term "appropriation item" makes much more
sense in the context of itemized appropriations bills than in regard to
the way appropriations bills are currently drafted. By itemizing
appropriations bills, the legislature would gain more control over
appropriations and would allow the governor to use the item veto to
trim pork from appropriations bills.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of the item veto power in Washington bears little relation to
its historical purpose of reducing wasteful spending. The item veto
power has placed the governor in the position of a superlegislator who
eliminates legislative compromise through veto of provisos. More-
over, in permitting the governor to use vetoed apportionments with
impunity, the legislature has, in effect, allocated the appropriation
power to the executive.
For the item veto to work in Washington, two concrete changes are
required. First, the scope of the governor's item veto power must be
defined and narrowed so that only appropriated dollar amounts and
apportionments of appropriated amounts are subject to veto. Second,
147. This bow wave added $882 million dollars to the 1989-91 Biennial Budget. Id. at 11.
148. Interview with Bob Longman, supra note 40.
149. Of course, the governor could veto the language providing that item must lapse, unless a
court decision prevented the item veto's use in removing provisos.
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the legislature must itemize appropriation bills so that the governor
can use the item veto for the potentially beneficial purpose of reducing
expenditures. These changes would maximize the opportunities for
cost savings and minimize the possibility of separation of powers
violations.
Stephen Masciocchi
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